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Taking Threats Seriously: Section 264.1 and Threats as a form of Domestic Violence
-byJoanna Birenbaum
Isabel Grant
1. Introduction
An alarming number of women are in abusive relationships where violence and threats of
violence pervade their lives.1 While the rate of homicide has declined in Canada in recent years,
the rate of spousal homicide2 has remained stable since 2004,3 with the overwhelming majority
of victims being women.4 In Canada, a woman is killed by her intimate partner or former
intimate partner every six days.5 Women report more serious episodes of violence6 and are more
likely than men to be exposed to multiple incidents of violence.7

Joanna Birenbaum, Toronto-based lawyer and former Legal Director of the Women’s Legal Education and Action
Fund. Isabel Grant, Professor, Faculty of Law at Allard Hall, UBC. We would like to thank Christine Boyle, Kent
Roach and Elizabeth Sheehy for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Laura DeVries, Laura Johnston, Karen
Segal and Brendan Ward for their research assistance on this paper.
1
In 2004, for example, roughly 653,000 women living in common-law or marital relationships indicated that they
had been physically or sexually assaulted by a partner at least once during the previous five years, which constitutes
approximately 7% of this population. Higher rates of violence are reported by women who have separated from their
spouses. In 2004, 21% of these women reported violence in the previous five years. Statistics Canada, Measuring
Violence Against Women: Statistical Trends 2006 (Ottawa: StatCan, 2 October 2006) at 17-18 [Measuring Violence
Against Women].
2
The term spouse here includes common law spouses and former spouses.
3
Statistics Canada, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile, 2011, (Ottawa: StatCan 2011) at 8 [Family
Violence]. While this Report is more recent than the Measuring Violence Against Women, supra note 1, it is also
written in gender neutral terms and fails to account for the unique characteristics of male violence against women.
4
Between 1974 and 2004, 2178 women were killed in Canada by their male intimate or former intimate partners.
This accounts for 77% of all intimate homicides (Measuring Violence Against Women, supra note 1 at 25).
Aboriginal women are particularly vulnerable to spousal homicide with a rate eight times higher than that of nonaboriginal women(Measuring Violence Against Women, supra note 1 at 67).
5
This figure was arrived at from data presented in Statistics Canada, Juristat, Homicide in Canada, 2010 by T
Mahoney (Ottawa: StatCan 26 October 2011) at 11, 12 and Statistics Canada, 2011 (Ottawa: StatCan 2011) at 3738.
6
For example, in 2009, women were three times more likely to report they had been “sexually assaulted, beaten,
choked or threatened with a gun or a knife by their partner or ex-partner in the previous 5 years”. Family Violence,
supra note 3 at 10; Molly Dragiewicz & Yvonne Lindgren, “The Gendered Nature of Domestic Violence: Statistical
Data for Lawyers Considering Equal Protection Analysis” (2009) 17 Am U J Gender Soc Pol’y & L 229.
7
Family Violence, supra note 3 at 11; Department of Justice, Spousal Abuse: A Fact Sheet from the Department of
Justice Canada, (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2001) [Spousal Abuse Fact Sheet]. In “Why Women Stay: A
Theoretical examination of rational choice and moral reasoning in the context of intimate partner violence” (2012)
45 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 179 at 179-180, Silke Meyer cites various studies as follows:
“Findings from international victim surveys show that IPV affects one in three adult women in most industrialized
nations, is a leading cause of injuries to women of reproductive age and is associated with 60% of homicides
involving a female victim”.
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The criminal justice response to domestic abuse of women has historically focused on discrete
acts of physical violence.8

There is increasing recognition, however, that woman abuse is a

“course of conduct crime”9 in which episodic physical violence is only one mechanism of
subjugation of women by abusive men. Overt and subtle threats of violence, as well as
emotional and psychological abuse, threats to take custody of children, financial control, and
isolation of women from family, friends, employment and other networks of support, create a
continuum of terror by which abusive men dominate and control their female partners. Threats
are often used to prevent women from leaving a relationship (if you leave I will kill you or your
child), to isolate women from other people in their lives (you’ll “get it” if you visit your family
or friends), to prevent women from reaching out to police and social services (don’t you dare call
police, or if you call the police, you will pay), and to keep women in a constant state of
uncertainty and fear. The Ontario Court of Appeal recognized this fact in R v Bates:

Crimes involving abuse in domestic relationships are particularly heinous because they
are not isolated events in the life of the victim. Rather, the victim is often subjected not
only to continuing abuse, both physical and emotional, but also experiences perpetual
fear of the offender.10
This article examines the Manitoba Court of Appeal decision in R v O’Brien11 which is currently
under appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.12 In O’Brien, the accused threated to kill his
8

This is probably true of the criminal justice system generally, which does not respond well to the crimes that occur
in the context of ongoing relationships. See e.g. Tamara L Kuennen, “Private Relationships and Public Problems:
Applying Principles of Relational Contract Theory to Domestic Violence” (2010) 2 Brigham Young University LR
515; Evan Stark, Coercive Control: The Entrapment of Women in Personal Life (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007) [Stark, Coercive Control]. More generally, see Mark Kelman, “Interpretive Construction in the
Substantive Criminal Law" (1981) 33 Stanford LR 591, who discusses this tendency of the criminal law to focus on
the narrow time frame of the acts in question.
9
Stark, Coercive Control, ibid at 379; see also Evan Stark, “Commentary on Johnson’s “Conflict and Control:
Gender Symmetry and Assymetry in Domestic Violence” (2006) 12:11 Violence Against Women 1019 [Stark,
“Commentary on Johnson”] at 1019-21.
10
R v Bates, [2000] OJ No 2558, 134 OAC 156.
11
R v O’Brien, 2012 MBCA 6 [CA Judgment].
12
The case will be heard on 6 December 2012.
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intimate partner when she told him she was going to have an abortion. After a brief summary of
O’Brien, our analysis will make two central points. First, we argue that in intimate relationships,
threats of death and bodily harm are a form of domestic violence, often used by men in concert
with physical violence and other forms of intimidation to control and dominate women. The
Canadian criminal justice response to charges of uttering threats in intimate partner relationships
must fully account for the cumulative, ongoing and dynamic nature of abuse, as well as abused
women’s complex and varied responses to abuse. Second, we examine the history of s.264.1 of
the Criminal Code and the case law to argue that the courts in O’Brien have applied the elements
of the offence improperly and in a manner that is inconsistent with the statutory language and
legislative intent. In so doing, the judgments incorrectly burden abused women with testifying to
their fear in response to threats by their abusers, despite the fact that such evidence is
unnecessary to prove the offence. This error of law reflects the continued privatization of
domestic abuse and violence against women more generally. The idea that male violence
against women is a private intimate matter between the couple in which the state should be
hesitant to intervene has historically hindered state responses to domestic violence.13 Further,
compelling abused women to testify to their fear risks exposing women to increased physical
violence and threats and ignores the complex considerations which drive abused women’s
decision to co-operate in the prosecution of their partners or to support their defence.14

13

See Frances Olsen, “Constitutional law: Feminist critiques of the public/private distinction” (1993) Const
Comment 319 at 6 for a review of literature demonstrating that domestic violence has historically not been
vigorously prosecuted because it was seen as a “private” family matter. See also Catherine Moore, “Women and
Domestic Violence: The Public/Private Dichotomy in International Law” (2003) 7 International Journal of Human
Rights 93; Jennifer Koshan, “Sounds of Silence: The Public/Private Dichotomy, Violence, and Aboriginal Women”
in Susan Boyd, ed, Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1997) 87.
14
It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the complex arguments for and against “no drop” policies in the
prosecution of domestic violence. For critiques of these policies see e.g. Kuennen, supra note 8. Kuennen criticizes
no drop policies for failing to take into account the complex relational factors that go into a woman’s decision
regarding prosecution. See also Lisa Mills, Insult to Injury: Rethinking Our Responses to Intimate Abuse

3

2. R v O’Brien
At the time of the alleged offence, O’Brien was incarcerated for assault and uttering threats. His
criminal record included convictions for uttering threats, assault and assault with a weapon
against two former intimate partners. O’Brien called his partner,15 AW, from a prison phone.
During the call, she told him that she was pregnant and that she was scheduled to have an
abortion. The accused attempted to persuade her not to have an abortion. When she refused to
accede to his request, the accused became increasingly angry and, among other statements, said
the following to her:
-

I’m going to kill you, man.

-

I mean it, man. Watch, man. I’ll be, on the 25th, on the 25th you’re
getting a bullet in your fucking head you fucking little whore, man,
o.k.? O.k.. And the guards just heard me so I’m probably going to get
charged for that. So I’m going to fucking kill you you little bitch
when I get outta here man. O.k., you fucking hear me? You’re dead,
you fucking whore. I mean it man. Watch your windows. I’m going
to shoot your windows out, bitch.

-

You’re going to fucking be dead when I get outta here if you fucking
keep talking shit.

-

I fuckin’ mean it. I’ll put a bullet right in your fuckin’ head, you
fuckin’ little whore, man, don’t fuckin’ be stupid, man. You kill my
baby, I mean it, man. Watch. You’ll be..You won’t even get a chance
to get skinny man. You won’t even get a chance. Watch man. I
fuckin’ mean it. Who’s gonna stop me from killin’ you, man? Who’s

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Leigh Goodmark, A Troubled Marriage, Domestic Violence and the
Legal System (New York: New York University Press, 2012); Erin L. Han, “Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop
Policies: Victim Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases” (2003) 23 BC Third World LJ 159. A central part of
these latter critiques is the concern with the denial of women’s autonomy and agency and the replication of male
disempowerment and coercion of women by the state. In contrast, proponents argue that no-drop policies work
against longstanding justifications for inaction and create credible threats of prosecution for batterers. See e.g.
Angela Corsilles, “No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or
Dangerous Solution?” (1994-1995) 63 Fordham L Rev 853; Kalyani Robbins, “No-Drop Prosecution of Domestic
Violence: Just Good Policy, or Equal Protection Mandate?” (1999-2000) 52 Stan L Rev 205; and Cheryl Hanna,
“No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions” (1996) 109 Harvard L
Rev 1849.
15
It is not clear from the evidence whether O'Brien and AW were former or current intimate partners.
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gonna stop me?
-

You’re telling me you’re gonna fuckin’ kill my kid and shit, I wanna
talk to you. I’m trying to fuckin’..I wanna fuckin’..Maybe that’s what
it is is cuz I’m not calling you and shit man. And because I beat you
up and shit.16

As the accused predicted, prison officials reported the conversation to the police and O’Brien
was charged with two counts of uttering threats and two counts of breach of probation. AW was
compelled to testify by the Crown.17 She testified that she wasn’t “worried about it” and “that’s
the way he normally talks”.18 On cross examination she agreed that she was “not personally
scared” and that the accused “runs at the mouth a lot”, “says a bunch of garbage sometimes”,
“says trash talk” and “was just being loud and belligerent…and that’s all it was”.19 She also
testified that her fourth child, present in the courthouse during the trial, was the baby fathered by
O’Brien.20

The trial judge acquitted the accused on all counts on the basis that, while the actus reus of
threatening had been established, the testimony of the complainant left her with a reasonable
doubt that the accused had intended that his words be threatening or intimidating. The trial judge
conceded that objectively the words were concerning, given the context in which they were
made, the tone of voice and the fact that they were repeated. However, she put a great deal of
16

R v O’Brien, 2012 MBCA 6 (Factum of the Appellant) at paras 8, 10; CA Judgment, supra note 11 at paras 6, 7.
AW’s testimony was extremely brief. The Crown asked her where she lived; the number of children she had;
confirmed that AW’s testimony was compelled; asked AW to identify herself and O’Brien as the voices on the
recorded telephone call; asked whether AW knew why O’Brien had called on the day in question; confirmed that
AW had said on the call that she wanted O’Brien “out of her life”; and asked how “being on the receiving end” of
the threat made AW “feel”. The Crown did not follow up with any further questioning in response to AW’s
testimony that she wasn’t “worried” about the threat. The transcript of the Crown’s direct examination is
approximately 2 ¼ pages and the transcript of the cross examination by defence counsel is approximately 2 ½ pages
long. Transcript of Proceedings, April 7, 2011 [“Trial Transcript”].
18
Ibid at p 8, lines 28-32, p 9, lines 29-34 and p 10, lines 1-11; see also CA Judgment, supra note 11 at para 11.
19
Ibid at p 9, lines 29-34, p 10, lines 1-11, p 11, lines 6-9; CA Judgment, supra note 11 at para 11.
20
Ibid at p 9, lines 24-28.
17
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weight on the fact that AW testified that she did not take them seriously. After finding that the
actus reus was made out, the trial judge continued:

So I have to consider the evidence of Ms. [W] when I consider the mental
element or the mens rea. Normally the mens rea is taken from the words of
the accused, absent any explanation from the accused, and as I pointed out
at the outset you have chosen not to testify, as is your right. But the
evidence in this case is somewhat unusual in the sense that Ms. [W] has
told the court that she was not concerned about the threats, that you shoot
your mouth off, if I can use the vernacular, that she did not want you
charged, she did not take the threat seriously. And so it is incumbent, and
the court is required, to consider the words in the context of the evidence of
Ms. [W], and when I do so, despite the fact that I am actually quite
concerned about the actus of the offence, the comments, the words, I must
say that I do have a reasonable doubt about the mental element of the mens
rea of the offence because of the evidence of Ms. [W], the fact she did not
take them seriously, and as I pointed out at the outset it is incumbent upon
the Crown to prove all elements of the case beyond a reasonable doubt.21
A divided Manitoba Court of Appeal upheld the acquittals.22 The majority agreed that the mens
rea requires only that the “accused had the required subjective intent, being that he meant his
words to intimidate or to be taken seriously” and that “it is clear that the test is not whether the
person who is the subject of the words uttered by the accused felt threatened, as it is not
necessary for the Crown to prove that the person even had knowledge of them”.23 The majority
also held that where the subject of the alleged threats is aware of the threat, his or her evidence
“is not to be ignored” and his or her testimony “forms part of the context within which the words
were uttered and must be considered as part of the circumstances that will determine whether a
reasonable person would find that the words were meant to intimidate or be taken seriously”.24

21

CA Judgment, supra note 11 at para 12.
Per Beard, MacInnes JJA, Steel JA dissenting.
23
CA Judgment, supra note 11 at para 28.
24
Ibid at para 29, emphasis added.
22
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The Crown had argued before the Manitoba Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred by
ignoring the evidence and context of domestic violence. The majority dismissed these arguments
for several reasons. It found there was insufficient evidence of domestic violence, as there was
nothing on the record other than the accused’s admission in the phone call that he beat her up.
The majority stated that on a fact specific review of this case, which is “very dependent on
seeing and hearing [AW] testify,”25 AW was “taunting” the accused and her voice on the phone
calls showed no hesitation or fear.26 The Court further held that “there was no evidence to
suggest that [AW] was afraid of the accused, or that she was testifying as she did to protect
herself or anyone else from future violence”.27 Finally, the Court also noted that the trial judge
was an experienced judge who frequently heard cases of domestic violence and that she would
“doubtless, have been alive to any concern as to whether [AW]’s evidence was, or could have
been, affected by being the victim of domestic violence such that she was not expressing her true
interpretation of the accused’s words”.28

In her dissenting judgment, Steel JA held that the accused’s words were not ambiguous or
careless; they were not spoken in jest, but were spoken seriously, with the accused himself
acknowledging that criminal charges could result.29 She reasoned that whether or not AW
provoked the accused, “the law does not sanction threats to kill as a method to convince a
woman to carry a pregnancy to term”.30 She persuasively concluded that:

25

Ibid at para 49.
Ibid at paras 5, 44.
27
Ibid at para 45.
28
Ibid at para 46. Our view, discussed below, is that even if A.W. had testified that she was afraid, that would not
have told us much about the accused’s intention; rather, it would have told us that the words were perceived as
threatening, which we argue goes to actus reus not mens rea.
29
Ibid at para 62.
30
Ibid at para 64.
26
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… it does not matter if this particular accused is an individual with an explosive
temper who often makes threats that are not then carried out. The fact “[t]hat’s
the way [the accused] normally talks” does not legitimate the threats. It does not
matter whether the accused intended to carry out his threats. It does not matter
if the recipient of those threats did not in fact feel intimidated. If the accused
intended to intimidate the complainant or instill fear in her when he uttered the
threats, then he intended them to be taken seriously and should be sanctioned
accordingly.31

3.Analysis:
i) Threats as a form of domestic violence

Threats of death or bodily harm in intimate relationships are a form of domestic violence against
women. The United Nations’ 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
defines domestic violence as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to
result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.32
In Canada, numerous provincial domestic violence statutes include threatening within the
definition of domestic violence.33 The prohibition against criminal harassment, which includes
threatening behaviour as one of four forms of harassment, was added to the Criminal Code in
199334 “as a specific response to violence against women, particularly to domestic violence

31

Ibid at para 67.
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, GA Res 48/104, UNGAOR, Supp No 49 at 217, UN
Doc A/48/49 (1993). Statistics Canada indicates that this definition has been widely accepted by the international
community. Its study of domestic violence explicitly includes threats of violence as a form of physical violence.
Measuring Violence Against Women, supra note 1 at 8-9.
33
Protection Against Family Violence Act, RSA 2000, c P-27, s 1(e)(ii); The Domestic Violence and Stalking Act,
CCSM, c D93, s 2(1.1)(b); Protection Against Family Violence Act, SNWT 2003, c 24, s 2(b); Family Violence
Protection Act, SNL 2005, c F-3.1, s 3(1)(c); Domestic Violence Intervention Act, SNS 2001, c 29, s 5(1)(b),(e);
Victims of Domestic Violence Act, SS 1994, c V-6.02, s 2(d)(ii); Victims of Family Violence Act, RSPEI 1988, c V3.2, s 2(2)(c), (e), (f); Family Violence Protection Act, RSY 2002, c 84, s 1.
34
An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Young Offenders Act, RS 1993, c 45 s 2. See Criminal Code, RSC
1985, c C-46, s 264.
32
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against women”.35 Government of Canada and provincial government publications across the
country include threats in their definitions or descriptions of intimate partner abuse.36 A federal
Department of Justice Family Violence Initiative publication on “spousal abuse”, for example,
recognizes that “there are many different forms of spousal abuse, and a person may be subjected
to more than one form” and that spousal abuse includes “using criticism, verbal threats, social
isolation, intimidation or exploitation to dominate another person”.37

In cases involving intimate partners, the offence of uttering threats under s 264.1 of the Criminal
Code must be understood in this context. Threats of death and bodily harm in intimate
relationships are often part of a constellation of behaviours which seek to control the choices and
actions of the women involved. Threats constitute a form of abuse in a number of ways. First,
they play a particularly powerful role in the domination and control of abused women through
intimidation and fear and by attacking women’s self-worth and self-esteem (e.g. “I can do what I
want to you, no one will help you, no one will believe you”). Section 264.1(1) of the Code
prohibits the use of threats as a mechanism for instilling fear and exercising control over the
person threatened. The Supreme Court of Canada described the purpose of s 264.1 in R v
McCraw:

Parliament, in creating this offence recognized that the act of threatening permits
a person uttering the threat to use intimidation in order to achieve his or her
35

Department of Justice Canada, Criminal Harassment: A Handbook for Police and Crown Prosecutors (Ottawa:
Minister of Justice, March 2002) at 25 [Criminal Harassment Handbook]; Isabel Grant, Natasha Bone & Kathy
Grant, “Canada’s Criminal Harassment Provisions: A Review of the First Ten Years” (2003) 29 Queens LJ 175.
36
Criminal Harassment Handbook, ibid at 25; Alberta Justice Communications, Domestic Violence Handbook for
Police and Crown Prosecutors in Alberta (Edmonton: Alberta Ministry of Justice and Solicitor General, February
2008) at 11, 29, 70 [Alberta Domestic Violence Handbook]; OHSCO, “Domestic Violence Doesn’t Stop When You
Go to Work: How to get Help or Support a Colleague who may Need Help” (Toronto: Occupational Health and
Safety Council of Ontario, February 2010) at 2; Nova Scotia Domestic Violence Prevention Committee, Report of
the Domestic Violence Prevention Committee (Halifax: Government of Nova Scotia, 2009) at 4.
37
Spousal Abuse Fact Sheet, supra note 7.
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objects. The threat need not be carried out; the offence is completed when the
threat is made. It is designed to facilitate the achievement of the goals sought by
the issuer of the threat. A threat is a tool of intimidation which is designed to
instill a sense of fear in its recipient. The aim and purpose of the offence is to
protect against fear and intimidation. In enacting the section Parliament was
moving to protect personal freedom of choice and action, a matter of
fundamental importance to members of a democratic society.38
The power of threats in abusive relationships should not be underestimated. Abusive
men do not necessarily use frequent physical violence to control their female partners.
As criminologist and expert on battered women, Professor Evan Stark, notes,
“[i]ntimidation can establish a regime of control even when the victim has not been
assaulted…In coercive control the idea of physical harm implanted in the victim’s mind
can have more devastating effects than actual violence”.39

Research by sociologist Michael P. Johnson on “intimate terrorists” (who deploy
violence to control their partners40) reveals that while severe physical violence and
injury are more likely to occur and escalate in the context of intimate terrorism, this is

38

R v McCraw, [1991] 3 SCR 72 at para 24 [McCraw].
Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 8 at 251. A recent study on women’s perceptions of their safety
after police intervention for domestic violence concluded: “It is not the violence itself that causes women
to feel in danger, but rather the meaning of the violence and the context in which the violence occurs with
battering, lethality threats, and sexual violence holding particular meaning.” Melissa E Dichter & Richard
J Gelles, “Women’s Perceptions of Safety and Risk Following Police Intervention for Intimate Partner
Violence” (2012) 18 Violence Against Women 44 at 57.. Battering is defined (at 46) as “a pattern of
violence used to gain coercive control over the victim; through violence and threats of violence, the
batterer establishes dominance in the relationship and decreases the victim’s independence”.
40
Michael Johnson’s work identifies three major typologies of intimate partner violence: intimate terrorism, where
the violent perpetrator uses violence in combination with a variety of other coercive control tactics in order to
attempt to take general control over his partner; situational couple violence, where physical aggression does not
involve a pattern of coercive control and which may be rooted in anger management, substance abuse, or a whole
variety of possible dynamics and factors; and violent resistance, which is the violence engaged in by many of the
women who are entrapped in a relationship with an intimate partner. Johnson also notes that there may be a fourth
type of intimate partner violence, mutual violent control, which involves two partners fighting for control of each
other, but notes that “it shows up only in very small numbers in most samples, and there is considerable controversy
regarding its very existence.” See Michael P Johnson, A Typology of Domestic Violence: Intimate Terrorism, Violent
Resistance, and Situational Couple Violence (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2008) [Johnson, Domestic
Violence] and Michael P Johnson, “Langhinrichsen-Rolling’s Confirmation of the Feminist Analysis of Intimate
Partner Violence: Comment on Controversies Involving Gender and Intimate Partner Violence in the United States”
(2010) 62 Sex Roles 212 at 212-213 [Johnson, Langhinrichsen-Rolling’s Confirmation]. The arguments made in this
article would apply to threats uttered in the context of intimate terrorism and situational couple violence, in which
threats and psychological abuse can escalate to physical and even fatal violence.
39
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not necessarily the case.41 Physical violence may not be severe or frequent. In fact, in
one study relied on by Johnson, 12% of women experiencing intimate terrorism had
never been injured at all and 22% reported being physically assaulted less often than
once a year.42 Moreover, due to the effectiveness of non-physically-violent forms of
subjugation and intimidation of battered women, rates of physical violence and injury
may decrease over time.43 Such a decline does not, however, make the relationship any
less abusive or dangerous.

Second, the serious role of threats in abusive relationships is revealed by their impact on
women who may live for years in a constant state of dread and terror. Abused women
report that psychological abuse is often more damaging, and the effects longer lasting,
than any physical violence, in part because of its duration and greater frequency.44
Verbal abuse undermines self-esteem and self-worth in its victims.45 Other studies

41

Johnson, Domestic Violence, ibid at 29; Johnson, Langhinrichsen-Rolling’s Confirmation, ibid; Michael P
Johnson and Janel M Leone, “Differential Effects of Intimate Terrorism and Situational Couple Violence: Findings
from the National Violence Against Women Survey” (2005) 26 Journal of Family Issues 322 at 332-334.
42
Johnson, Domestic Violence , ibid at 29.
43
Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 8 at 278, citing Minna Piispa, “Complexity of Patterns of Violence Against
Women in Heterosexual Partnerships” (2002) 8 Violence Against Women 873.
44
Miriam K Ehrensaft, “Family and Relationship Predictors of Psychological and Physical Aggression” in Daniel
O’Leary and Erica M. Woodin, eds, Psychological and Physical Aggression in Couples (Washington: American
Psychological Association, 2009) at 107; Roland Maiuro, “Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, But Names
Will Also Hurt Me: Psychological Abuse in Domestically Violent Relationships” in K Daniel O’Leary & Roland
Maiuro, eds, Psychological Abuse in Violent Domestic Relationships (New York: Springer Publishing, 2001)
[Maiuro, “Preface”]; Diane R Follingstad et al, “The Role of Emotional Abuse in Physically Abusive Relationships”
(1990) 5 Journal of Family Violence 107.
45
Stark, Coercive Control, supra note 8 at 258-259; Johnson, Domestic Violence, supra note 40 at 41; Lisa
Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Listening to Battered Women (Washington: American Psychological
Association, 2008) at 18-19. Stark refers to women who report feeling “dead” inside; Johnson refers to
social work professor Valerie Chang’s book, I Just Lost Myself: Psychological Abuse of Women in
Marriage (Westport, Conn: Preager, 1996), which bears its title due to the centrality of the loss of selfesteem to the women survivors interviewed in the book. A recent example in Canada is the testimony of
Nicole Patricia Doucet, who was charged with counseling to commit the murder of her abusive husband,
Michael Ryan. Doucet was acquitted of these charges on the basis of the defence of duress by the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court and Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. A Crown appeal of these acquittals is currently
pending before the SCC. Doucet testified to the subjugation and loss of any sense of self. For example,
she testified that the reason she didn’t go to the police after Ryan’s sexual and other assaults was that: “I
was afraid. I was afraid because of what he would do if I ever refused. I just had to protect Aimee
[Doucet’s daughter]. I had to protect myself. You keep the peace. If you don't disobey, you're keeping the
peace. You don't know what to do. You feel helpless. You feel worthless. You don't even feel like a human
being anymore, but you know that you have to do it in order to be safe” (R v Ryan, 2011 NSCA 30 at para
21,emphasis added).
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indicate that psychological abuse may be a much greater predictor of fear than physical
abuse and may cause more emotional harm than physical abuse.46

Third, while threats of death or bodily harm are in and of themselves criminal conduct
and a form of domestic abuse (particularly when employed as a tactic of control and
domination), there is a relationship between threats and intimidation and the escalation
of physical abuse and femicide. Psychological abuse (which may include threats) has
been described as a “key predictor” of future physical abuse in intimate relationships.47
Research also indicates that physical abuse rarely occurs in the absence of
psychological aggression.48 Domestic violence risk assessment tools used across North
America identify death threats, and in particular threats with a lethal weapon such as a
gun, as a significant risk factor for intimate femicide.49 Attempts to control the
autonomy of one's partner also increase the risk of further and potentially more
dangerous violence. A comparative study of women killed by their intimate partners in

46

Leslie Sackett & Douglas Saunders, “The Impact of Different Forms of Psychological Abuse on Battered
Women” (1999) 14 Violence and Victims 105.
47
Ehrensaft, supra note 44 at 108, citing KD O’Leary, Slep Smith, & SG O’Leary, “Multivariate Models of Men’s
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the United States concluded that a “highly controlling” abuser, combined with
separation, increased an abused woman’s risk of fatality ninefold.50

Threats of death and bodily harm by intimate partners or former intimate partners,
therefore, should not be approached as discrete acts or isolated incidents, nor
normalized as the way a man usually speaks to his partner. Rather, such threats should
be understood in the context of the dynamics of abusive relationships. As Professor
Stark argues:

The emphasis on discrete acts of violence contrasts markedly with experiencebased accounts where battered women report abuse is “ongoing”; includes a
pattern of intimidation, isolation, and control, as well as assault; and exacts high
levels of fear and entrapment even when violence has stopped.51

An incident-specific response to domestic violence by the criminal justice system not only fails
to recognize the cumulative nature and seriousness of a threat or series of threats in creating
conditions of fear and entrapment for the abused woman, but also may contribute to her
subjugation. Stark points out that when an incident-specific approach to woman abuse is used by
the criminal justice system (and other services providers like medical personnel), “the oppression
battered women experience is disaggregated, trivialized, normalized, or rendered invisible…”.52
In response to the criminal law’s focus on discrete incidents of physical violence, Stark observes
that “because the vast majority of domestic violence involves ’minor’ assaults (e.g. pushes,
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shoves), when the law requires police and courts to view abuse through the prism of discrete acts
of violence, woman battering is downgraded [to a less serious offence]”.53

Further, in the context of abusive relationships in which violence or threats of violence are used
to create conditions of captivity (referred to in this paper as “intimate terrorism” or “coercive
control”), threats not only instill fear, but draw on and reinforce sexist stereotypes to control
women and erode their sense of self-worth. The gendered exploitation inherent in abusive
relationships in which violence is “embedded in the context of general power and control”54 is
lost when viewed in a disaggregated way. A “core tactic” of coercive control is to exploit
gendered norms to microregulate and subjugate women in their traditional sex-roles, like
cooking, cleaning, caregiving, providing sexual services and reproduction.55 Violence or threats
of violence are employed because the meal wasn’t good enough, the house not tidy enough or the
woman didn’t perform “well enough” sexually. Threats may be directed at forcing women to
comply with subjugating demands, such as sexual acts which the woman finds degrading or
degrading rituals at mealtime. The ultimate purpose of a threat, for example, to choke a woman
if a meal is even five minutes late or if she answers the phone on the fourth ring instead of the
second ring (micoregulation and entrapment), and the impact of this ongoing threat on the
woman (captivity), is missed unless the centrality of sexual inequality to the “technology” of
control is recognized.56
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Domestic abuse must be assessed like a movie, not as a snapshot.57 Focusing on isolated events
fails to contextualize the course of conduct that can have such devastating effects on women.
Uttering threats is often central to patterns of control and domination, sometimes enforced
through “minor” or infrequent violence and sometimes not enforced with violence at all. Death
threats are not acceptable when made out of anger to a police officer, a crown counsel or other
third party; their seriousness should not be downgraded when made to an intimate partner,
particularly given empirical evidence that threats are often used to control and subjugate. Even
where the abuse in a relationship cannot be characterized as “intimate terrorism”, threats are a
risk factor for (or a predictor of) physical violence and must be treated seriously, not dismissed
or privatized as “that’s just the way he talks to his wife/girlfriend when he gets mad”.

ii)Interpreting Section 264.1
The Legislation:
Section 264.1 (1) of the Code provides:
Every one commits an offence who, in any manner, knowingly utters, conveys or causes
any person to receive a threat
(a) to cause death or bodily harm to any person;
(b) to burn, destroy or damage real or personal property.

Uttering threats comes under the "Assault" heading in the Criminal Code: legislative recognition
that uttering threats is a form of assault. This provision in its current form was first enacted in
1985.58 Prior to 1985, the provision prohibited threats communicated by “letter, telegram,
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telephone, cable, radio, or otherwise”.59 Prosecutions under this provision led to confusion about
what modes of communication were to be criminalized. In R v Nabis,60 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that “or otherwise” did not include oral threats. The 1985 provision removed this
limitation by clarifying that threatening “in any manner” was criminalized.61

The 1985 provision required a threat to cause “serious bodily harm”. In 1994 the requirement of
“serious bodily harm” was changed to simply “bodily harm or death”.62 At the same time, the
offence was changed from an indictable offence to a hybrid offence, allowing for the possibility
of prosecution on summary conviction.63 These changes were brought in at the same time as
changes were made to peace bonds that aimed to make peace bonds more effective in responding
to violence against women.64 The changes were implemented as “tools” to prevent and respond
to domestic violence65 and were made shortly after the first criminal harassment provisions were
enacted in 199366 in response to several high profile cases involving the harassment and murder
of women.67 The criminal harassment provisions in s 264 explicitly require that the complainant
be afraid, probably because the conduct involved in criminal harassment may otherwise be legal
without the repetition and fear it induces. The uttering threats provision in s 264.1, by contrast,
does not require fear, presumably because the behaviour of threatening bodily harm or death is in
itself criminal. While no explicit links were made between violence against women and the
changes to the threatening provision, we believe that this historical context is nonetheless
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significant as demonstrating a legislative intent to strengthen criminal laws dealing with violence
against women.

Both criminal harassment and uttering threats are gendered crimes in the context of intimate
relationships. With respect to uttering specifically, a 2009 Statistics Canada Report indicates:
Similar to patterns seen among physical and sexual assaults, female victims of
criminal threats were more often victimized by a spouse or dating partner than
were male victims. In particular, the proportion of females (18%) threatened by
a spouse or ex-spouse was 6 times higher compared to their male counterparts
(3%). The proportion of female victims threatened by a current or former
dating partner (12%) was also about 6 times higher than for male victims (2%)
of uttering threat offences. In contrast, males (24%) were about twice as likely
as females (12%) to be threatened by a stranger.68

The Elements of the Offence:
At first glance, it appears simple to break down the elements of the offence in s 264.1(1)(a). The
actus reus requires that a threat of serious bodily harm or death be uttered, conveyed or received
by any person. Uttering threats is not a consequence crime in the sense that it need not be shown
that the accused caused the victim to be afraid. 69 It is well-established that whether an utterance
is threatening is to be assessed by the reasonable objective observer. The actus reus was clearly
described in McCraw:
[T]o determine whether spoken or written words constitute a threat to cause
serious bodily harm they must be looked at in the context in which they were
spoken or written, in light of the person to whom they were addressed in the
circumstances in which they were uttered. They should be viewed in an
objective way and the meaning attributed to the words should be that which a
reasonable person would give to them.70
68
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The mens rea requires that the utterance or conveyance of the threat be done knowingly. This
element is more difficult as there are several possible interpretations of this requirement. The
most minimal intent requirement would be that the accused knew he was uttering the words and
that he knew the nature of the words, i.e. the characteristics that made them threatening.71 The
Courts have by and large taken a more restrictive approach to mens rea , although it is not clear
that the level of intent has been conclusively determined. The Manitoba Court of Appeal, as well
as other trial and appellate courts across the country, concluded that s 264.1 requires an intent to
instill fear or intimidate or an intent that the words be taken seriously.72 These three articulations
of intent are frequently used interchangeably, despite the potentially different meanings they
carry.73 McCraw is usually relied upon for this more restrictive interpretation of mens rea, where
the Court spoke of an accused using threats to carry out his goal of intimidation.74
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Where the accused does not testify, as in O'Brien, or where we are otherwise uncertain about his
intention, we look to his utterances to infer what he was thinking at the time.75 The Manitoba
Court of Appeal recognized this in an earlier decision on uttering threats:
As was pointed out by Cory, J., in R. v. McCraw (at p. 82), "[T]he
determination as to whether there was such a subjective intent will often
have to be based to a large extent upon a consideration of the words used by
the accused." Nonetheless, a trier of fact must find the accused to have had
the subjective intent, an intent which goes beyond the mere utterance of the
words.
Although an inference can be drawn from the words used that the accused
intended to instill fear in someone, they must be considered in the context
of the circumstances in which they were uttered. The specific intent to
instill fear can only be inferred if the circumstances permit. ....76

Although the reasonable meaning of his words will inevitably influence the factual determination
of what the accused must have been thinking, the inquiry should still be focused on his
subjective mental state.77 Our argument in the following section is not that the high level of mens
rea is necessarily inappropriate for this offence but rather that this mens rea requirement has
been misapplied through a blurring of the actus reus and mens rea requirements. Some
confusion about these elements is not surprising, given that whether the words are objectively a
threat (actus reus) will inevitably be influenced by the trier of fact's assessment as to how the
accused meant the words to be perceived (mens rea). However, we argue that the consideration
of whether the reasonable person would have found the words threatening is strictly an actus
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reus inquiry going to the question of whether the words uttered were a threat. It is not necessary
to consider this in answering whether the accused knew the words he was uttering were
threatening. The cases however, frequently lump together the elements and apply a reasonable
person standard to both actus reus and mens rea, with detrimental consequences for women, as
we will explain below.

j:
The proposition that mens rea is based on a consideration of whether a reasonable person would
consider the words threatening demonstrates a misunderstanding of the elements of the offence.
Objective tests relying on the reasonable person are usually applied to establish the mens rea for
negligence offences. The mens rea for threatening is clearly not a negligence standard, as
evidenced by the use of the word “knowingly”. The reasonable person test simply confuses the
mens rea analysis. A careful analysis of the case law demonstrates that the role of the reasonable
person in uttering threats is in assessing the actus reus of whether the words were a threat, not
whether the accused meant the words to be threatening. To determine whether he meant the
words to be threatening, we look to the actual words and the context in which he spoke them to
infer what he must have intended. The test is not what other people (including the victim)
thought about his utterances or even what a reasonable person might have thought. The test is
whether he intended the words to intimidate or be taken seriously, not whether they were taken
seriously. That can best be determined from an analysis of his actions, not from the responses of
the recipient of the threat.
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Some of the confusion dates back to a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in R v McCraw.78 In McCraw, the Court had to address whether a written threat of rape
(along with a detailed account of the sexual acts he was going to perform) sent to several women
by the accused constituted a threat of “serious bodily harm or death”. The trial judge held that
this was not a threat of serious bodily harm or death, and characterized the letters as "more of an
adoring fantasy than a threat to cause serious bodily harm”.79 He held that rape may or may not
involve serious bodily harm but that it does not inevitably do so. The Court of Appeal overturned
this decision, noting that the object of the threat was to create fear that serious force would be
used if the complainants did not submit to sexual intercourse with the accused. Thus, the issue
before the Supreme Court of Canada was the actus reus of uttering: was there a threat of serious
bodily harm? The Court concluded that serious bodily harm was "any hurt or injury, whether
physical or psychological, that interferes in a substantial way with the physical or psychological
integrity, health or well-being of the complainant”.80

The Court could have concluded that a threat of rape meets this definition and left it at that. But
instead it made a number of other statements regarding the scope of s 264.1(1)(a). First, it
acknowledged that threats are an attempt to use intimidation to accomplish one’s objects.81 The
threat need not be carried out; rather it is a tool of intimidation designed to instill a sense of fear
in the recipient.82 Second, relying on its own earlier decision in R v LeBlanc,83 the Court
concluded that it is irrelevant whether the accused actually intended to carry out the threat.
78
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Rather, the criminal sanction is aimed at the intent to instill fear.84 Third, the intent to instill fear
will be based "to a large extent upon a consideration of the words used by the accused”.85 If, for
example, the accused did not understand the words, he may not have the necessary intent.

The Court then went on to consider how to determine if particular words contravene the section.
This is still an actus reus inquiry, i.e. the question is whether there was a threat of (then serious)
bodily harm. This is where the reasonable person enters the equation:
The nature of the threat must be looked at objectively; that is, as it would be by
the ordinary reasonable person. The words which are said to constitute a threat
must be looked at in light of various factors. They must be considered
objectively and within the context of all the written words or conversation in
which they occurred. As well some thought must be given to the situation of the
recipient of the threat.
The question to be resolved may be put in the following way. Looked at
objectively, in the context of all the words written or spoken and having regard
to the person to whom they were directed, would the questioned words convey a
threat of serious bodily harm to a reasonable person?86

At the risk of being repetitive, these words set out the test for determining whether the words
were threatening (not an issue in O’Brien) not whether the accused meant them to be uttered as a
threat.87 The accused's mens rea in McCraw was not at issue. Again, at the end of its judgment
the Court sums up:
to determine whether spoken or written words constitute a threat to cause serious
bodily harm they must be looked at in the context in which they were spoken or
written, in light of the person to whom they were addressed and the
84
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circumstances in which they were uttered. They should be viewed in an
objective way and the meaning attributed to the words should be that which a
reasonable person would give to them.88
The Supreme Court addressed the mens rea of s 264.1(1) in R v Clemente.89 There, the accused
uttered a threat to his social worker that if he was transferred to another social worker, people
would find a dead body in the second social worker's office. The Court held that mens rea was
the intent to intimidate, or an intent that the words be taken seriously, treating these formulations
as virtually interchangeable. In the absence of testimony from the accused, intent will be
determined "by the words used, the context in which they were spoken, and the person to whom
they were directed”.90 In Clemente, a case where the intended victim never heard the threat and
could thus not have been frightened, the Court somewhat blurred the actus reus and mens rea:
Under the present section the actus reus of the offence is the uttering of threats
of death or serious bodily harm. The mens rea is that the words be spoken or
written as a threat to cause death or serious bodily harm; that is, they were meant
to intimidate or to be taken seriously.
To determine if a reasonable person would consider that the words were uttered
as a threat the court must regard them objectively, and review them in light of
the circumstances in which they were uttered, the manner in which they were
spoken, and the person to whom they were addressed.
Obviously words spoken in jest or in such a manner that they could not be taken
seriously could not lead a reasonable person to conclude that the words
conveyed a threat.91

The second paragraph here blurs the role of the reasonable person test – which goes to question
of whether there was a threat – with whether the accused meant the words to be threatening. The
McCraw Court had made it clear that the reasonable person test went to whether the words
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constituted a threat, whereas Clemente shifts that focus to whether the words were “uttered as a
threat”, which appears to refer to mens rea, although it may not have been so intended.92 In our
view this is what led to the confusion in O'Brien.

Why does it matter whether we use reasonableness as going to mens rea or actus reus? This use
of the objective test in assessing mens rea is problematic because in practice it has shifted the
attention away from what the accused has done and his intent in doing so to the unpredictable
response of the subject of his threat. The factors we look at to infer mens rea when an accused
does not testify, such as the manner in which he said the words, and the person to whom they
were spoken, is about inferring what must have been going on in his head at the time he spoke
and keeps the focus on his behaviour and his intent. We consider the person to whom they were
addressed, not to assess her fear (since she or he may never have heard the threats) but to
consider why the particular person was targeted by the accused for a threat. 93

The dangers of relying on the reaction of the woman who is the subject of the threat can be seen
in the Crown’s factum on appeal to the Supreme Court. To its credit, the Crown does attempt to
put threats in the context of domestic violence but we have some concerns about the way in
which it does so. The Crown factum suggests that an abused woman might not feel fear because
the traumatic impact of abuse can blunt her responses to it.94 The Crown asserts that AW’s
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evidence should be rejected because she was in denial of her fear as a result of Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD), thus characterizing her response to the threats as unreasonable or
pathological. The Crown’s approach is problematic in two respects. First, it shifts the legal focus
away from the accused’s intention to instill fear to the woman who is the subject of the threat. In
addition to being wrong doctrinally, as discussed above, it is troubling in that it makes the crime
about the woman (the “victim”) rather than the behaviour and intention of the (male) aggressor.
This slippage has a long (and discredited) history in the sexual assault context where women are
disbelieved because of the perceived “inadequacy” of their resistance to male violence.95
Second, while it is true that some battered women suffer from PTSD, others do not. This
argument pathologizes abused women’s rational decisions to recant or refuse to co-operate in the
prosecution of their intimate partner. In fact, an abused woman may be all too aware of the
danger she is in and may make rational calculations about keeping herself safe.96 One significant
reason why women refuse to co-operate is the serious risk that their testimony will lead to
escalated coercion and violence.97 This is particularly true given that the police and the justice
system have historically not done a good job of protecting women from further abuse.98
95
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We are not suggesting that a woman’s fear is never relevant evidence in considering the elements
of uttering threats. In many uttering cases women testify as to how afraid they were. In our
view, a woman’s fear is evidence supporting the Crown’s assertion that there was a threat, i.e.
that the actus reus is established- she is afraid because she feels threatened. Such evidence is
particularly important where the threat is veiled or ambiguous as discussed further below. Her
lack of fear, in rare cases, could be relevant to mens rea if, for example, she supported the
suggestion that the accused was joking. As discussed below, we have found no such cases and
find it difficult to imagine any. What we are saying is that her fear is not an essential element of
the offence and that, correspondingly, a lack of fear should never be determinative in deciding
whether the accused meant his words to be intimidating or taken seriously. A police officer may
not feel fear if a detained individual threatens the officer’s life but this is not determinative of the
suspect’s intent. As the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in R v MacDonald:

it is not an essential element of the offence that the person subjected to the
threat actually fear for his or her safety as a result of the threat. Indeed, that
person does not even have to know that the threat was made. The reaction of
the person threatened is of evidentiary significance only.99

In the context of a threat made against a police officer, one trial judge put it even more strongly:
"It is trite but true that whether or not the police were actually intimidated or took his threats
seriously is irrelevant. What is relevant is the accused intent in saying them".100

couples, and White unmarried women, even when controlling for other relevant variables”. Finally, they note that
sentencing of domestic offenders tends to be lenient and even when men receive a prison sentence, it is likely to be
shorter than for other types of offenders.
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In our view, a woman’s fear or lack thereof is more relevant to whether the utterance was
threatening than to whether the accused intended it to be. Moreover, where, as in O’Brien, there
is an undisputed record of what was said, where the threat is unambiguous and the accused’s
subjective intent can be assessed from the words used repeatedly, the woman’s asserted lack of
fear should not be necessary to establish either the actus reus or the mens rea.

Re-Assessing O’Brien
The Court of Appeal in O’Brien explicitly separates physical violence from threatened lethal
violence, concluding that there was no foundation for determining that the complainant was
abused, despite the accused's admission that he beat her up. The Court failed to acknowledge that
repeated exposure to threats of death or bodily harm is abusive whether or not there is clear proof
that he beat her up.101 We are not arguing that the Crown should have to prove abuse but rather
that repeated threatening by a man of his intimate partner is abuse, regardless of whether there is
physical violence, and that the interpretation of the elements of uttering threats and the
complainant’s testimony about the threats, must be viewed in that context.

In our view, both the trial judgment and the majority of the Court of Appeal in O’Brien
normalize repeated threats of violence in the context of intimate relationships. As Madam Justice
Steel recognized in dissent in O’Brien, it is untenable to argue that because the accused regularly
threatens death or bodily harm, the threats do not meet the threshold of the criminal law. The
101
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fact that a woman may have endured many threats does not negate criminal liability any more
than it would for a complainant who, “used” to being sexually assaulted by her intimate partner,
no longer resists. Repeating threats in most contexts is likely to be seen as inculpatory.102 There
is no reason why the repetition of threats in an intimate relationship should serve as a mitigating
factor.

Similarly, to suggest that anger can negate the mens rea for uttering threats is inconsistent with
Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence regarding mens rea generally.103 In Parent, that Court
held that extreme anger, on its own, could not reduce murder to manslaughter by negating mens
rea.104 Extreme anger was only relevant if all the conditions of a specific defence were made out
(such as automatism or provocation). In R v MacDonald the Ontario Court of Appeal correctly
characterized the accused’s anger at his wife as supporting his guilt, rather than negating it.105 In
O’Brien, extreme anger was translated into “blowing off steam”.

The “blowing off steam” analysis is highly problematic. In R v Tucker106 the accused threatened
to kill his common-law spouse by slicing her from ear to ear. The trial judge found that the
complainant felt intimidated and expressed fear "but she also indicated that she was not
concerned for her safety".107 At other points in the judgment, he stressed that the complainant
had not been afraid. In other words, she did not think he was going to slice her ear to ear. The
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trial judge thus concluded that the accused was just blowing off steam and did not intend his
words to be taken as intimidating.

Although s 264.1 does not require threats of death, both Tucker and O'Brien involved very
serious threats of murder. Both were spoken in extreme anger and, in O'Brien, to persuade the
recipient to change her mind about having an abortion. As we have established earlier, verbal
abuse is but one form of violence used to control women in abusive relationships. It is highly
correlated with physical violence. Characterizing death threats as “blowing off steam” or “just
the way the accused talks” only in the context of domestic violence normalizes intimate violence.

We recognize that those involved in intimate relationships argue and sometimes say things in
anger that they do not mean. Not all such disagreements deserve the intervention of the criminal
law and the potential for a criminal record for the threatener. However, the law has drawn the
line at threats of bodily harm and death that are meant to intimidate. We know that such threats
in the domestic context are predictive of future violence. If we attempt to draw a further line
between intimate partners and others and accept that threats are permissible in the former
context, we are essentially saying that this kind of abuse is a private, family matter that is
unreachable by the law, an approach that has seriously disadvantaged women in the context of
domestic violence.108

This paper argues that on the facts of O’Brien, AW’s evidence of lack of fear was not relevant to
mens rea (nor would it have been relevant to the actus reus). There may, however, be situations
where testimony from the recipient of the threat will be necessary to prove the crime. Where
108
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there is a dispute about what was said, it may be necessary to hear from the recipient of the
threat. Where the threat is of a veiled nature, which may not appear to an objective observer to be
threatening but when seen in the context of the relationship takes on special significance, it may
be necessary for the complainant to explain that significance to demonstrate why otherwise
neutral words could constitute a serious threat in the circumstances.109 For example, where there
is a history of violence between the parties, the complainant may be aware of certain words or
cues that signal the onset of violence even though to an objective observer those words might not
be seen as threatening. (“You know what will happen when we are alone”.)

Further, the case law is clear that threats made “in jest” are not captured by s 264.1. We think it
is important to distinguish threats that were “in jest” and threats that were a result of out-ofcontrol anger or frustration. We were unable to find any cases in the context of intimate partner
violence in which the accused advanced a defence that the threat was a “joke” or made “in jest”
and we do not find this language helpful in understanding mens rea.110 In theory, in exceptional
cases, a complainant’s evidence might support the assertion that the accused was speaking "in
jest” as described in the case law, however it is difficult to imagine such a case in reality and
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difficult to imagine charges being laid in these circumstances.111 In O'Brien, there was no
suggestion that the accused had been “kidding”. There was a clear record of what was said, the
words the accused used were obviously threatening, spoken in extreme anger with a raised voice,
and intended to interfere with her reproductive freedom. The guards who heard the conversation
were concerned enough to take action as the accused explicitly predicted they would. In this
respect, O'Brien could have been resolved very simply. There was no doubt about the actus reus.
The trial judge and the Court of Appeal agreed that there was a threat of death. With respect to
mens rea, the accused stated in the phone call "and the guards just heard me so I'll (sic) probably
going to get charged for that" indicating that he knew his words were threatening. Instead, the
trial judge complicated the analysis by considering whether the complainant felt frightened in
deciding whether the accused meant to be threatening.

We are concerned, too, that the judgment below was influenced by misperceptions and
stereotypes about women who experience abuse. In cases of threats uttered by an intimate
partner, it is critical that the criminal justice system avoid typecasting the complainant or
creating classes of deserving and undeserving victims. In O’Brien, the majority of the Court of
Appeal held that “relevant” to the context of domestic violence was the fact that AW was
“taunting” the accused, that her tone of voice was not fearful, that she laughed during the
conversation, and that “she responded to his words in an equally aggressive and forceful manner
when he made the statements…”.112 That these factors are relevant to whether O’Brien intended
his threats to intimidate or instill fear (and also to whether O’Brien may have abused AW)
suggests a misapprehension of the dynamics of abusive relationships. As the minority judgment
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of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Malott emphasizes, courts must be careful not to
perpetuate any stereotypes of abused women as
victimized, passive, helpless, dependent”, penalizing those who do not fit into the
“stereotypical image of the archetypal battered woman” such as those “who have
demonstrated too much strength or initiative, women of colour, women who are
professionals, or women who might have fought back against their abusers on
previous occasions.113

Women’s responses to abuse are varied and complex. Women frequently use a combination of
strategies to decrease or cope with abuse,114 which may include shows of verbal strength or even
“violent resistance” in self-defence or as a mechanism for exercising “control in a context of no
control”.115 The Domestic Violence Handbook for Police and Crown Prosecutors in Alberta, for
example, lists “self-defence” and “initiating violence as a means of gaining some control” as two
of seven “common survival or coping strategies” of abused women.116 Moreover, women’s
responses to abuse may not appear coherent or consistent. They may resort to “subordination of
self” (as a form of rational and “active problem-solving”)117 in some circumstances and “stand
their ground” in others, such as reproductive choice.118 The point being threefold, that: (i)
women who experience abuse engage a range of strategies that should not be pathologized,
stereotyped or oversimplified; (ii) a woman’s demonstration of strength (verbal or otherwise)
does not mean she is not subject to coercive control or abuse; and (iii) a woman’s strength or
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resistance should not minimize or justify her partner’s threats of death or bodily harm nor be
viewed as evidence that he didn’t really mean to control or intimidate her. In O’Brien, AW’s
anger or assertiveness should not affect the Court’s assessment of O’Brien’s subjective intention
to coerce AW into one of the most significant life and health decisions any woman can make:
having a child. This decision can have physical, psychological, economic and other
consequences for AW, but could also tie her to O’Brien for the rest of her life.

We have argued that threats of death or bodily harm intended to intimidate and control women
are in and of themselves a form of domestic violence and that evidence of physical violence
should not be required before threats are taken seriously. The context of domestic violence is not
limited only to cases where there is a proven history of abuse. In addition to the threat itself
being a form of violent control, here exerted most troublingly over reproductive decisionmaking, it is important to remember that abuse in intimate partner relationships can begin at any
time. In some cases, abuse even begins when the woman becomes pregnant119 and, as we have
said, threats are often a precursor to and predictor of physical violence.120 While evidence of
past violence in an intimate partner relationship can strengthen the prosecution’s case, it should
not be necessary or determinative, except perhaps in cases involving veiled threats where the
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history of abuse may be required to prove the actus reus. As well, as noted above, the burden of
adducing evidence of past abuse has detrimental implications for women who may not wish to
testify to abuse because of fears of escalation of violence, deep feelings of shame, or difficulty
recognizing (or believing others will recognize) that even slaps, grabs, shoves and other forms of
“minor” violence constitute abuse. In O’Brien it appears from the accused’s telephone statement
that he had been physically violent toward AW. Ultimately, however, even if there were no
history of threats and physical assaults, the absence of prior abuse does not make a repeated
threat to put a “bullet in the head” of a woman who intends to terminate a pregnancy any less
serious, intimidating, controlling, or criminally culpable.

4. Conclusion
We do not know whether AW was subject to ongoing violence at the hands of the
accused or whether O’Brien’s threats influenced her ultimate decision to carry the
pregnancy to term. But we do know that for many Canadian women, ongoing abuse is a
serious problem and that threats play an integral role in the coercive control of these
women. Any interpretation of s 264.1(1)(a) must take this tragic reality into account.
The majority judgment in O’Brien essentially creates a new defence for those accused
of uttering threats: the mens rea of the offence can be negated if the victim testifies that
she did not feel threatened. This adds more pressure on women in abusive relationships
to testify in support of their abusers, and can endanger their safety even further. Where
there is an undisputed record of what was said and where the threat is unambiguous, the
complainant’s asserted lack of fear should not be relevant. We are also concerned that
men are more likely to be given the "benefit of the doubt" on the mens rea issue in
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domestic cases in a way that we do not see when police officers or other public officials
are threatened. This is particularly troubling given that police officers are generally in
positions of considerable power over those charged with uttering threats at them while
in custody or under arrest and handcuffed or in the back of a cruiser. Threats directed at
police officers by drunk offenders, while a serious matter, are not as likely to exert
control over the behaviour of the officer. The opposite is true in the domestic context,
where the position of power held by abusive men goes to the heart of the reason for
criminalizing the uttering of threats of death or bodily harm: the abuser is using his
position of physical, economic and social power to intimidate and control his female
partner. We would urge the Supreme Court of Canada to reject any disparities in
approaches to uttering cases in light of the central role threats play in male violence
against women. Threats in the domestic context require heightened, not downgraded,
attention and concern.
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